Well here is a video I never thought I'd make. In the lead up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, most observers stressed how one sided the matchup was. They compared tank numbers, aircraft numbers, and defence budgets, and bluntly came up with the idea that Ukraine must be doomed. Now, after a week of fighting, Russia has made advances, sure, but there is every sign that the invasion has been fifty times more of a clusterf*ck than they were expecting, and Ukrainian resistance is giving NATO's traditional rival a run for its money. Why? I'll leave the mil and ex-mil to comment on the strategy, operations, and tactics we've observed over the last week. But there's another part to all this, and that's that Russia may spend more on its military than Ukraine...but it also spends a bunch of that on blingy capabilities that have and now they're paying the price. They've got thousands of nukes, they've got battlecruisers, and next gen hypersonic missiles...but they have tanks missing
In any conflict, there are always going to be myths that emerge. Stop me if you've heard some version of this one over the last few weeks: "Russia isn't sending their best troops/equipment. They just sent in the conscripts first to soften the Ukrainians up. Any day now the real troops will go in with updated gear and you'll see!" No. Russian visually confirmed equipment losses paint a very clear picture and it's this: If anything, the better equipment and units are paying a disproportionately high price in this campaign to date. I am not saying Russians have been well trained or well supplied. I'm not saying that they haven't used conscripts. I'm not even saying that they haven't shown a disregard for casualties. All I'm saying is that there is no evidence that Russia is holding back it's best men or materiel. In this video, I look at the myth, the available evidence, and present sources you can use yourself.
The world has been slowly, quietly adjusting to the growing use of unmanned systems in warfare. From the spectre of Predators and Reapers stalking the mountains of Afghanistan during the war on terror, there's been a growing appreciation of what these systems can do, but it's always been coupled with the feeling that 'in a real war' they wouldn't be nearly as useful. Then the Bayraktar TB2 started blasting $25 million anti aircraft systems in Ukraine while Russian drones have played a seemingly important role spotting for precision guided artillery rounds. When an aircraft starts mowing down anti-air systems, you pay attention. In this presentation, I give an overview of what we've seen in terms of the usage of drones and loiter munitions in Ukraine, then I get on to what makes that effectiveness so damn scary...the fact that these things are cheap. Really cheap (at least by defence equipment standards). Compared to tanks, jets, and all the kind of traditional balance sheet plat
Before the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the popular narrative was that the Russian armoured and mechanised forces would cut a swathe through Ukraine in a matter of days. A few weeks into the war, that narrative has flipped 180 degrees, with memes about Russian tanks exploding, and the Javelin missile system as the saviour of Ukraine. So extreme has been the swing, that questions are again (aren't they always) being asked about whether tanks can survive on the modern battlefield. I'm going to disappoint today by not advocating that all tanks go to the scrapyard. Instead, I'm going to give a brief history of the evolution of ATGMs, examine the evidence from Ukraine, and conclude that while missiles and shoulder fired rocket seem to provide tremendous opportunities, especially for smaller nations, the tank's role isn't done. There are paths for future evolution for the tank, they're just likely to be expensive and require extensive investment.
For all the videos on the technical side of this conflict, the ATGMs, the MANPADS and the drones, I thought it was impossible to touch on the manpower side of this particular conflict. If you watch enough media, you'd be forgiven for thinking Ukraine is hopelessly outnumbered in this conflict by the great Russian bear. If they've held on, so the argument goes, it's through sheer grit and determination. The reality, I think, is that two sides are fighting very different wars. Russia, undertaking its "Special Military Operation" has focused on making up its numbers through the use of paramilitaries, allies, proxies, and mercenaries. The great bulk of Russian reservists, former conscripts, are so far staying at home.
There's no denying that the Ukraine-Russia war is, in part, an information war, and with the recent announcement that Russian forces would be withdrawing from the Kiev front, the propaganda has gone into high gear. Russia claims it's destroyed the Ukrainian army's ability to fight, and will now liberate the Donbass (as well as claiming that's all it ever wanted) Some, going to extremes the other way, see Ukrainian victory as imminent, and the Russian army as a broken force. While I want to get back to questions of defence economics and industry as quickly as possible, I wanted to address this topic from the recent poll before moving on. I'll include the disclaimer that this is a question I've actively avoided to date, because it's harder to quantify and assess than other questions, but hopefully you appreciate the approach I've taken. In the end, only one person knows the true scope of Russia's intentions, and I'm not Vladimir Putin.
So apparently hour long presentations on defence investment weren't dry enough, so I'm dusting off the Economics degree (strongly recommended when pairing with military or strategic studies) to ask the question of what the economic situation may be if this war drags on. Some are insisting sanctions are achieving nothing, and that Russia is well placed to outlast Ukraine. Others are convinced that Russia's war will grind to a halt under the weight of these sanctions. In this video, I look at some of the tactics Russia has been using to minimise the impact of sanctions, as well as the basic economic disparities between Russia and the Western powers backing Ukraine. Suffice to say, Russia is economically outmatched, but it has a variety of tools and strengths to leverage, including energy exports and a defence sector that has spent years moving towards self-reliance.
Continuing on from our look at the relative economic power of Russia as compared to Ukraine and its supporters in NATO, today I look a little more at the question of military equipment resupply specifically. I try to break down the scale of the Russian army's equipment reserve and contrast that with the way we have seen, and can expect to see, the resupply effort evolve on the Ukrainian side of this fight. I also look at the military industrial capability that sits behind these powers, and the role it might play in the event this conflict stretches to be a matter of months and years, rather than weeks. I want to stress that this video is not a prediction of a long war, I make no prediction on that point, it's just an attempt to continue looking at a question I have not seen covered in great depth - how might this war evolve if the conflict does go on.
In this video, I take a look at what Russia's been doing that has caused so much concern around the world, both in terms of demonstrating new weapons and issuing warnings and threats. Then I dive into Russian doctrine around nuclear weapons use, as well as the reality of the nuclear taboo, in order to determine how great the actual threat of Russian nuclear weapon use is. Finally, I talk a bit about what other nations can do if they're determined to avoid any breach of the nuclear taboo, and keep Russian warheads locked up in their storage bunkers where they belong. A caveat as always that I am not a nuclear strategist by trade, but there are a number of good talks and articles out there if you would like to know more. I come at this from the perspective of someone who has studied and written on cold war era.
In this video, I look at what the modern lend-lease Act actually does, assess its significance, and then focus on some of the lesser known, and altogether less dramatic mechanisms that are being used to authorise the ever growing flow of US money and weapons supporting Ukraine. I'm also rather proud I managed to get the video under 30 minutes. The side effect of that is that I do not have time to delve into each of the individual pieces of legislation discussed. My descriptions of how foreign military financing work for example are necessarily simplistic, but I've tried to make sure the basics of what you need to know are here.
This war has produced some truly interesting takes - so many that I'm already planning my next myth-busting video as we speak. But one recent one stood out as as both particularly strange, and also as a good opportunity to discuss a serious topic. Recently a number of media organisations ran stories suggesting that the shipment of American missiles to Ukraine were dangerously depleting American supplies to the point where urgent measures are necessary or American security would be threatened. So yes, I'm going to deal with the idea that sending Stingers to Ukraine is a danger to the USA, but I'm also going to talk about how deep American weapon stocks are, what it means to have your security threatened, and why America probably shouldn't rush to crash-manufacture Stingers just because they're finally using the ones that were in storage. Defence procurement decisions have lasting impacts, and while the decision to ramp up Javelin production is an obvious one, I think we should be wary
n this episode, I look at the history of Swedish and Finnish neutrality (and shift to non-alignment in the post cold war era), examine what these two nations would bring to NATO, and what that means for Europe, Russia, the USA, and global peace and security. I want to stress that while I talk about the relevance of these new NATO members in the context of certain military scenarios that have appeared on Russian TV, I don't believe any of those are at all likely. They're used because they help illustrate the point, and because when something appears on Russian TV, you can't argue that there's zero chance of that being on the Kremlin's bucket list. Also, because I'm aware the word is used differently around the world, please note that when I'm using the term 'liberal' in reference to the post-war order, I'm referring to the system of institutions, rules, and norms the victorious powers put in place after WW2 rather than any contemporary politics.
In this video, I try to take a somewhat light hearted look at how corruption in a military context can (and sometimes does) work, citing examples of actual cases and using hypotheticals to demonstrate the kinds of actions that can rot an institution from head to tail. For those of you in countries that face this problem, it should all seem a little familiar. Examples are taken from the sources listed below and I make no independent representations on the veracity of any claims. I don't know exactly how much is stolen from the Russian defence budget, I doubt anyone does. But what I can do, is help us understand how a nation capable of producing some of the most advanced defence equipment in the world would be running out of fuel on day 3, and be rolling out museum piece tanks less than three months into a major conflict.
In this video I try to give historical context to Poland's decision to throw its resources behind Ukraine and put focus on what this nation, with an economy nominally the size of New Jersey's (ppp-aside), has done to keep the Ukrainian army fighting while preserving the lives and wellbeing of millions of Ukrainian civilians.
n this video we look at the importance of infantry, even on a battlefield dominated by advanced vehicles and systems, examine the roots of the Russian deficit, and also have a look at how Russia is trying to get around this issue. In doing so, we're also going to tackle a number of myths and questions regarding Russian manpower in Ukraine. Ever wondered how Russia can apparently outnumber Ukraine in the Donbass despite Ukraine mobilising reservists or why people claim there are tends or hundreds of thousands of conscripts with WW2 equipment fighting for Russia? We're going to talk about the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, and try to answer some of those questions.
In this video I look at the sanctions measures that have been imposed, what impact they've had, and try to assess how well the Russian and Ukrainian economies are holding up, and what may be next in store as the fighting (and economic pressure) continues.
For weeks, the most requested topic from my Patrons and coming in by email to look at some of those claims, ranging from the wacky to the reasonable, and to cast a critical eye on the way the war has been covered in its first four months. At their request, I'm going to have a look at some of the various claims that have come up, and put forward comments on some of the most pervasive ones (especially those that were nominated multiple times). Because I'm trying to cover a lot of ground, don't expect the same level of deep-dive detail as normal, but hopefully we can have some fun with it.
In this video, I go through some history of how the Bundeswehr came to be so run down. I go after the myth that the Bundeswehr has been poorly funded (there's both a yes and no answer there) and go through some of the reasons I think Germany's planned 100 billion Euro equipment spend could go horribly wrong if proper reforms and plans aren't put in place.
In this video we explore the pre-war Russian and Ukrainian artillery forces, look at the way the artillery war has evolved to date, how logistics may impact the sustainability of both forces going forward, and what lessons forces around the world might (tentatively) take from the war so far, based on the information in the public domain.
Before February 24th, there probably weren't many Western commentators that would have bet on a post-soviet state of 9 million people taking on a significant strategic role in deciding the fate of Ukraine and European security. But these are strange times, and following a call in the comments of a previous video, I've decided to look at the current (and potential future) role of Belarus in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since Russian troops advanced into Ukraine from Belarusian territory in February, speculation has been rife that Belarusian dictator Lukashenko would send his own troops into battle alongside his Russian allies. Practically ever week brings a new series of articles announcing new mobilisation efforts or exercises in Belarus, and a heighted threat to Ukraine's Northern border.
In this video I take a look at the rotary aviation side of the Ukrainian war (with a particular look at the Russian KA-52), try to piece together how the tactics have changed, try and explain some of the weirder things we've been seeing, and examine what the losses and challenges mean for the future of these aircraft.
In some of my earliest coverage of the Ukraine war, I noted that just comparing defence spending between countries was extremely difficult and not all budgets are created equal. Today following a Patron vote, I'm going to try and unpack that a little more by diving into the world of defence economics and production 101. In doing so, we're going to try and answer some questions. Why does America dominate the global arms market? How can a 5th generation fighter be cheaper than those decades older than it? And why do so many nations chose to buy in arms rather than build their own despite the fact it leaves them highly reliant on other countries?
In this video I look at that initial missile campaign, the way the campaign evolved subsequently, and what lessons other countries might take from the war to date. I also address the question of sustainability - is Russia running out of these precision munitions, and to what extent do their production facilities have the ability to compensate. One thing I do want to say as well, is that while I try and take a reasonably detached look at issues like this, I want to make clear that discussing the performance of these systems shouldn't take away from recalling the very real human impact of their use, particularly against civilian targets or in built up areas.
Previously, I've looked at the way in which Russian force design and political decision-making have left Russian forces with a surplus of heavy equipment, but an inadequate supply of quality infantry. Today, thanks to a Patron vote, I look at Ukraine's situation. There, the combination of volunteers, popular resistance, and compulsory mobilisation filled the ranks with hundreds of thousands of new troops - but where a shortage of equipment and training has prevented them from realising the true potential of a mobilised, committed nation at war.
I think it's fair to say that the days of Moscow being the hub of the world's second most powerful conventional military are at an end. Now, that power rests in Beijing. The PLA's budget is vastly larger than Russia's but a mere fraction of what the US spends. Despite that, China has gone through an incredibly rapid military modernisation over the last two decades, building new platforms and fielding new technologies so quickly that the gap between its capabilities and the USA has narrowed significantly. How? Today I look at the Chinese military budget, industry, and the wonders of purchasing power parity.
Throughout the cold war, the Soviet Union dominated as a supplier of arms to the world, rivaling, and sometimes exceeding the United States as a source of global arms exports. With the fall of the Union, the former Soviet arms industry struggled, but the Russian Federation steadily rebuilt its share of the global market, resting on a reputation as a reliable seller of 'rugged, reliable and affordable' weapons to those in the world without the diplomatic alignment, cash, or desire to purchase Western made equipment. By 2014, Russian arms exports started to suffer reverses, damaged by sanctions and being cut off from industrial integration with Ukraine. But the industry survived.
If one thing is clear after six months of fighting in Ukraine, it's that there is little chance of an imminent, overwhelming battlefield victory to end the war. Instead, the struggle has become (as expected) one of attrition and economics. A question of Russian economic resilience, matched against the will of Ukraine and its allies to carry on the fighting, and Europe's ability to endure rapid and deep cuts in the supply of Russian energy resources. In this 6 month update on the war, I focus not on the battlefield so much as the politics and economics of the war, and ask the question of how much pain is being inflicted, and if we should expect them to carry on in a way that winning a long war requires.
When we think of major naval powers, we usually think of the big players. The USA, the USSR/Russia & the PRC - but surprisingly enough, in recent times all of them have sold relatively few of their ships and submarines abroad. How can it be that major naval powers, with significant military shipbuilding capacity, find themselves in this position? Well thanks to the results of the recent topic votes here and on my Patreon, you get to spend the next 56 minutes finding out. Maximum possible credit to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for making their data freely and publicly available in easy to manipulate formats - it makes covering topics like these much, much easier by providing good, open-source data.
A few weeks ago the Ukraine war was one of attrition and grinding advances, with Russian attacks in the Donbass an Ukrainian actions in Kherson both running into heavy defensive operations. Then suddenly the Ukrainians launched their operation in Kharkiv Oblast, and within less than a fortnight, the Ukrainians would reclaim more territory than Russian forces had gained in months of bombardment and attrition-driven advances. The war in Ukraine began with desperate defensive operations by the Ukrainian armed forces and population. Russian forces ended the first days pushing on the Ukrainian capital as the Ukrainians called for anyone capable of holding a rifle to stand up to defend the capital.
Captured equipment has been a feature of human conflict going back to the point where one human stole another human's bashing rock. But normally there are limits on how much it can be used. Supplying, repairing, or training on captured hardware is usually a difficult thing - unless the enemy is using basically the same kit you are. The Russian invasion of Ukraine involves a contest between two sides using compatible (largely) Soviet or Post-Soviet kit, coupled with a Russian force that seems predisposed towards abandoning equipment to the enemy. The result is that Ukraine (supplied by its farmers in some cases) has made extensive use of captured kit (as have the Russian aligned proxies). This video looks at some of the data behind that captured kit, discusses some of the challenges involved in recovery and repair (thanks to a guest contribution by everyone's favourite US Officer, Nicholas Moran) and the strategic significance of all this stuff that's been recovered and reused.
For nearly seven months, the war in Ukraine was not really regarded as a genuine war by the Russian government. The fighting would be done not by a fully mobilised Russian force, but by regular units, mercenaries, and Donbass conscripts - Russia's own conscripts would stay at home. But after seven months the result of that complacency was a crushing shortage of manpower to feed Russian frontline units. Ukrainian mobilisation had made good manpower losses and allowed the formation of entirely new units - while the Russian regular army, still undoubtedly a powerful force, found itself overstretched and forced to trust sections of the front to proxies or Rosgvardia. The results of that policy were obvious during the Kharkiv offensive. Now, Russia has decided to double down and recommit to war. Announcing mobilisation, enacting stop-loss, and 'annexing' parts of Ukraine.
Last week we talked about Russian mobilisation and what it might mean for Russian force generation this year and next - and in particular, I noted the fact that it was possible that the problems were resolved and new combat power was generated. In order to assess what impact that may have on the course of the war though Winter and into 2023, it's important to consider the Ukrainian side of the equation. The Ukrainians have been clear on their ambitions for next year, and set out what they believe their force requirements to be. So the question becomes - what are those requirements and can they meet them. In this episode, I explore that question, augmented by excerpts from an interview with the former commander of the US Army in Europe - LTG Ben Hodges (Ret.)
The Russian Air Force began the war in Ukraine with a formidable inventory of combat aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters) supported by an array of stand-off munitions and EWAR capabilities. In the opening hours, it seemed that those capabilities may be paying off, with paratroopers inserting at Hostomel without interception by Ukraine's integrated air defence system (IADS). At the same time, Russian columns were (seemingly incomprehensibly) being picked apart by slow moving TB-2 Drones. But things changed quickly, and since the stabilisation of the situation, the airspace over Ukraine has been contested. Aircraft fly low to avoid interception, while new threats periodically emerge to challenge the equilibrium. In this video I look at the impact of air-defence systems on the Ukraine war, and what lessons observers may be taking based on the available data.
The Russian Black Sea Fleet entered the Ukrainian war as the unchallenged master of that body of water. Ukraine's own fleet was small and less modern, and the opening weeks of the war were dominated by news of the Russian fleet launching missile attacks and threatening naval landings that pinned down Ukrainian forces in Odessa. But when the Moskva sank, the pattern of naval activity changed dramatically. Now, the Russian fleet stays mostly away from the Ukrainian cost, nervous of missile, drone, and air threats posed by an opponent whose own navy is mostly neutralised. In this episode I look at the evolving war in the Black Sea, the evolution and role of the Russian navy there, the sinking of the Moskva - and what if any lessons foreign observers might be taking from the war at sea so far.
Throughout 2022, implied or explicit Russian military threats to Europe by Russian politicians or media figures have become so common as to be almost ubiquitous. In many ways, this is a continuation of long historical pattern dating back to the cold war, when much of Western Europe lived in fear that, at any moment, the Soviet army may come storming West with a phalanx of metal and manpower. For many European leaders, the assumption long was that only the USA could serve as a meaningful counterbalance to the Soviet threat. Even with the end of the cold war, NATO wargames and academic papers alike have often modeled scenarios where Russian forces maul NATO opponents, occupying the Baltic States or Poland in short order, demanding an American response.
Over the last several months I've spent a great deal of time (and will spend more time) looking at the role that Ukraine's friends and allies have played in supporting its war-effort. This has included the provision of funds, weapons, humanitarian aid and the taking in of millions of Ukrainian refugees. Against the backdrop of that assistance, it's easy to paint Russia as entirely isolated, a pariah state without friends to turn to. While it may not have the allies that Ukraine does, that is obviously not entirely true. From Iranian drones to North Korean shells, there are signs that Russia is turning to friendly or allied powers for the tools it needs to carry on its war - and in this episode we look at those nations and what impact they've had so far...and may have in the future.
The performance of a military system is about more than the sum of its equipment, manpower, and training. Culture and practices are critical. The Russian army appears to suffer from serious cultural issues. Corruption is a key one, while the practice of making up obvious lies to cover up the real state of affairs (which everyone then goes along with) and telling the boss what they want to hear at all costs - those practices enable corruption to thrive, and seriously undermine battlefield decision making. In this episode, we look at the culture of deception in the Russian army, explore some of the common complaints, and discuss some ways it may (I am not a Kremlinologist) potentially impact or have impacted Russian decision making in Ukraine.
While much of the narrative around the early stages of Russia's 2022 invasion centre on the battle for Kyiv and the reverses Russia suffered there, in the South, the Russian invasion was altogether more successful in its opening moves. Advancing from Crimea, the Russians rapidly secured a number of critical positions in the South of the country, including a regional capital on the right bank of the Dnipro, the city of Kherson. The fighting to take back Kherson would be some of the hardest for Ukrainian forces. They would face a number of high quality Russian units who were heavily dug in, and they would do it over unfavourable ground. The fighting would take months and claim many lines before the final Russian withdrawal in November.
Military modernisation is a complex task for any state. Individual system selection is usually based on competitive trials and an extensive review and evaluation process. Usually. Poland's plans are a little different - ordering what is basically an entire new army's worth of equipment (with more tanks than many other major European states combined) from the Republic of Korea without any sort of extended trials process. In this episode, I ask the question of why a country in Europe would suddenly buy 1,000 tanks and hundreds of artillery pieces from a country half way around the world without so much as a trials program for the tank.
The 2022 phase of the war in Ukraine began in the closing weeks of winter, with a February offensive rapidly coming to face the onset of mud and thawing conditions. Now, in December, Ukraine prepares for a full winter of full-scale, conventional conflict. Winter conditions are extremely demanding, both on manpower and materiel, and in this episode we look a little closer at what is involved in operating in cold weather conditions, how cold Ukraine gets, and how prepared both sides seem to be for the onset of their winter war.
In the opening months of the war, Russia's formidable arsenal of cruise and ballistic missiles was directed against a wide array of targets, from ground based air defences to military bases and infrastructure. For more information on that stage of the campaign, please refer to my previous video on the subject. But since October, Russia has turned both these systems and its newly arrived Iranian drones on Ukraine's critical infrastructure instead, particularly its power grid, sending millions into rolling (or total) blackouts. These attacks have all the hallmarks of strategic bombing, an attempt to destroy the ability and will of a nation to resist by striking targets behind the lines. It seems reasonable to assume that Russia's focus has thus turned from using its best weapons to destroy military units, to coercing the population and Government of Ukraine to surrender.
For months now, a city with a pre-war population of 70,000 has been the focus of relentless artillery and infantry attacks by the Russian military and the "Wagner PMC." For many commentators, the attacks seem nonsensical. At a time when Russia is pivoting to defence just about everywhere else along the line, why keep pouring men and materiel into a city that simply doesn't have value relative to the effort expended trying to take it. In this video I zoom in on the battle for Bakhmut, and explore its history, implications, and some of what we have heard about the tactics there.
Taking a quick break from the horrors of trench war and artillery combat in Ukraine for a week, we instead try to gaze forward towards the 2030s and the future of air combat. Fighter jets are among the most expensive, complex platforms that any nation builds and maintains (losing out to submarines and warships mostly because of the scale of the latter). For years, the US was the undisputed leader in the fighter domain, having introduced the 5th Generation F-22 Raptor in 2005, while challengers like the SU-57 would have to wait until the 2020s (and rise to fame a little thanks to the new Topgun film).
In Ukraine, perhaps no weapon has caused more losses, or decided more engagements than the artillery. With contested airspace both side have turned to the big guns to support their operations - and both have consumed ammunition at a prodigious rate (albeit Russia many times faster than Ukraine). In this episode - I look at the question of production and supply and ask the question - are Russia or Ukraine going to run out of shells in 2023
In this episode, we look at the basics of war-economics, industry conversion, and try to understand why 'short wars' are so hard to win between peer opponents, once the economic struggle begins in earnest.
While tanks and fighters tend to win public attention, the fighting in Ukraine has done a lot to remind us of the critical role played by the infantry. And to survive and thrive on the battlefield, the infantry in Ukraine rely on their armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles to enable to enable movement and provide fire support. Those vehicles, so critical to both sides have, however, been lost in extreme numbers - with no vehicle on the Russian side having suffered more visually confirmed losses than the BMP-2. Now, it seems, the floodgates are opening on the supply of Western IFVs to Ukraine. In this video I look at these vehicles, their employment in Ukraine, and suggest that despite being lost in large numbers - that they will remain critical in the fighting to come.
Militaries, like any organisation, share a basic vulnerability - they're made up of people. And wherever there are people, there is an organisational culture. Culture can shape the way a military performs just as much as the capabilities of its weapons or the count of its personnel. Having all the tanks in the world only means so much if the system maintaining them is weakened by corruption and false reporting - factors we've explored before. But there's a third part of this story, the component that helps explain why systems adopt inefficient structures, struggle to coordinate or become filled with mutual distrust and self sabotage. Politics. Where the political interests of individuals deviate from the interests of the collective, bad things happen, and where leaders begin to put more focus on loyalty than on competence, then a system will never live up to its full potential. This episode serves as the third episode in the trilogy that began with "How corruption destroys armies"
Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine revealed significant issues with Russian planning, force structure and military culture. On this channel I've spent the better part of a year exploring some of those issues and helping to explain why, as suggested back in March 2022, this was (and is) a much closer war many analysts expected. But it is equally important not to underestimate Russian strengths and capabilities. From information warfare to ammunition production and mobilisation potential, Russia has a suite of resources and capabilities that it can leverage. Following a popular vote, in this episode I look at Russian military performance and capabilities in Ukraine, and why I believe it remains a major threat for Ukraine in 2023.
Last week I talked about the enduring strengths of the Russian armed forces and their ability to launch offensives and apply pressure in Ukraine. Faced with that pressure, Ukraine's ability to carry on the fight will be driven not just by its own determination, but by the flow of weapons and assistance from its allies abroad. Aid to Ukraine has evolved dramatically since February 2022, and there are few topics that have attracted more constant press coverage away from the battlefield itself. So today I try and set out how aid has evolved, who the major contributors are, and the impact aid has had - and may have in 2023.
While the news often focuses on the role of large, expensive systems in the Ukraine war (think of the attention given to tanks, aircraft, or MLRS and SAM systems in recent weeks and months) some of the most omnipresent and disruptive systems have actually been terrifyingly cheap and accessible. Off-the-shelf commercial drones converted for military use have been deployed by the truckload, while some of Russia's more successful weapons have been comparatively cheap loitering munitions and kamikaze drones like the Iranian Shahed and Russian Lancet. Videos of equipment destroyed by drones that might cost a thousandth of the price have become image of the war across social media. In this video, I examine the use of these (often civilian) systems in the war in Ukraine, look at international developments, and ask what lessons we can take from the terrifying rise of cheap sensor and cheaper precision on the battlefield.
After a year of hard fighting there are a rush of observers trying to make sense of the current balance of power in Ukraine. The focus in often on (often small) movements in the frontlines, casualties, or the performance of particular platforms and systems. Those things matter, but wars are not generally fought to take individual trenches or solely to inflict casualties. They are fought for strategic objectives. In this episode I dig into Russia's history of Empire, its modern strategic objectives, and try to assess whether or not the war in Ukraine represents a success or failure by Russia's own chosen metrics (as far as they can be determined). My suggestion is that in repeating a number of the mistakes previously made by leaders of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, it can be argued that Putin has already condemned the Russian federation to a strategic reverse.
Much of the the defence content online focuses on what might be called major power competition and the cutting edge platforms that go with it. We often focus on the race by major military powers to field the latest and greatest expensive jets, ships, or submarines in quantity - and it's often those systems that capture the imagination But all those things have something in common - they cost immense amounts of money, and for most nations, keeping up with the USAF or the shipbuilding efforts of the PRC just isn't on the cards. So following a vote by my patrons I decided to look at the question of how smaller (both in terms of population and/or economic power) nations can try to defend themselves in a world dominated by larger powers.
For centuries, leaders often depended on bands of mercenary warriors to make up their military strength in times of war, but as national militaries evolved, these formations shank from prominence, with modern PMCs generally being focused on support roles like base or VIP security or logistics (even if their contracts grew massively post 2001). Wagner doesn't follow that example. A force tens of thousands strong, Wagner has helped spearhead the Russian offensives around Bakhmut, and taken on international prominence. In this episode, I look at the evolution of PMCs, Russia's modern employment of them, and the implications of Wagner's role in Ukraine and its public spats with the Russian MoD.
Over the last year, the Ukraine war has played out both on the battlefields of Ukraine, and on global markets where energy warfare, sanctions, and industrial mobilisation efforts went head to head. Russia wanted to freeze Europe, while the Western allies sought to strangle the Russian economy with sanctions. A year on - I want to look at how successful these competing economic campaigns have been. Setting the stage to look at battlefield developments, attrition, and force regeneration in the near future.
The Russian invasion of 2022 began with a multi-pronged winter invasion of Ukrainian territory. After a series of reverses in late 2022, the Russian effort to reclaim the initiative in Ukraine seems to have begun...with another multi-pronged winter offensive. In this episode, I look at the way that offensive has played out, what observations and lessons might come out of the last three months, and what that may mean for the war to come. Also we're going to talk about the shovels story, because we have to do better than that.
Territory may be the most commonly used barometer for assessing the success or failure of the winter campaign, but just as important is the impact of the fighting on the forces. Attrition is intrinsically linked to war, as men and equipment are ground down by the effort and by enemy action. In this episode we look at loss estimates, discuss the challenges of attrition, and update on the efforts of both sides to make up losses and generate new offensive potential.
Before the war, the Russian Government had poured significant sums into the modernisation of its air-force, acquiring hundreds of new aircraft, deploying new weapon systems and testing the force over Syria. In Ukraine, the VKS has found itself as the stronger party, but none the less held off by Ukrainian air defences and fighters and incapable of delivering decisive support for ground forces. In this episode we look at the air war (building on previous discussions of ground based air defences and helicopters) and also at one of the most contentious issues for Western nations supporting Ukraine - whether UA needs (and should receive) Western built aircraft.
From the time NATO was founded in 1949 to the recent accession of Finland, the United States has remained the foremost military power in NATO. But a question that is not often asked is why? Why would a power like the USA continue to expand promises of defence to an ever larger group of nations that cannot hope to offer a similar level of capability or assistance in return. The acceptance of new allies into NATO or bilateral and multilateral security treaties has not always been without domestic and international opposition. And so today I wanted to follow up on my video on Russian grand strategy, with its baked in goal of undermining American influence and global leadership, with an examination of America's published security strategy, the role alliances and coalitions play in it, and some of the theory behind why the argument can be made that the basis of American global influence and its privileged security position owe as much to its alliances and coalitions as to other aspects
Often we think of war and peace as binary states - one is either at war or at peace. But history is full of examples of the line between those two states being blurred, and in a modern world of nuclear weapons and globalised economic and military competition, that competitive state between war and peace has grown particularly prominent. When Russia overtook Crimea in 2014 with its "little green men" the world got a high visibility view of what a hybrid war, combining information warfare, unconventional methods and conventional military force might look like. Today, I want to give an overview of hybrid war methods, their potential, and potential defences against them.
Japan's culture of pacifism is rooted in the nation's post-war experience and the restrictions on its rights and ability to wage war set out in Article 9 of its post-war constitution. But Japan's economy is deeply dependent on the global security situation, and with rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific and the shock of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine Japan's plans have undergone a sudden transformation. Old taboos about long range weapons have dropped away, and a huge influx of spending aimed at overhauling JSDF capabilities is now being planned. There is no change to Japan's constitution, and Japan's cultural and legal restrictions on the use of force remain deeply entrenched - but the capabilities of the JSDF are likely to change. In this video, I look at Japan's strategic position and the present strength of the JSDF, unpack Japan's 2022 defence strategy, and what impact it may have on both Japan's capabilities going forward.
Besides atomic ordnance, perhaps no weapon system commands public and media attention like hypersonics. No other weapon, when used in Ukraine, is basically guaranteed to command a news cycle. And yet their importance is hotly debated. There are those who argue the US has fallen behind in an absolutely critical field of military technology - and likewise others who argue the entire class of systems represent an overhyped waste of money. In this episode I try and provide at least an introduction to that multi-billion dollar question...
The much expected Ukrainian 2023 counteroffensive (sequel to the well known trilogy in 2022 "Kyiv" "Kharkiv" & "Kherson") has, alongside Bakhmut, been a major topic of speculation and discussion for months now. As a topic it is so heavily debated that there isn't even agreement over whether or not it has started, is yet to start, or will never start at all. For the most part, while some preparations are obvious, Ukraine has succeeded in keeping its actual plans secret, and even a leak of classified American documents did little to definitively answer the question of where and when Kyiv is likely to strike to attempt to reclaim the initiative after Russia's Winter and early Spring efforts. By popular request, today we take a chance to look at how we got to this point - how have both sides prepared for the offensive to come, what military actions are presaging it, and what it might mean for the war over the next few months.
Given the storm of email I got after posting that video, I feel confident saying that there may be a strong perception on the internet that France is a nation lacking in serious military heft, both now and historically. The reality is that France has long been one of Europe's major military powers, and while no longer the great power it was before WW1, France remains nearly unique among European States for a number of reasons, ranging from being the only Nuclear armed EU state, to being one of the few nations around the world with the ability to meaningfully project power internationally, supported by carrier aviation. In this video I look at the French military and military industry as they currently stand, but also at what Paris' future plans tell us about the way the French military (and economy) are likely to evolve in response to the war in Ukraine and rising international tensions.
The first computer predates the first hacking attack, the first aircraft were not armed, and the first satellites were blissfully immune to any targeting or attack. But humans are humans, and if there's a target to hit, sooner or later militaries will try to find a way to hit it. And where a domain becomes particularly valuable (in the way space has becomes) it makes sense that it will not remain immune to attack forever. In this episode I begin what I hope is a miniseries (to be spread out over time) on war as a domain for competition and, potentially, warfighting. I look today specifically at the basics of space combat, and some of the tools available to nations who want to take the fight to an opponent's space-based capabilities.
Frontlines in Ukraine often move only slowly - but that does not mean the war is being fiercely fought day by day. Often this takes the form not of territory taken, but of exchanges of fire either over the frontlines or, critically, against operationally or strategic targets behind the lines. For nearly a year, Ukraine relied primarily on HIMARS and M270 to counterbalance Russia's advantage in longer ranged weapon systems, but successive Russian defensive adaptations (including pushing targets out beyond GMLRS range) mean that these systems are not always viable answers to Ukraine's pressing military needs. The arrival of British Storm Shadow missiles presents a step change in Ukraine's long range capabilities. Today I look at how that aspect of the war has evolved, the significance of the Storm Shadow system, and how Ukraine's allies are steadily building its ability to fight at Operational ranges using this and other systems. In that context it becomes clear that Storm Shadow is
While not taking away from the immense sacrifices and efforts of the the involved forces, allied aid to Ukraine has been one of the decisive factors in the war so far. Ukraine has constantly sought new capabilities, while Russian media and politicians have often tried to stoke fears and warn against taking any additional steps.
Army artillery and missile systems have been some of the most critical weapons of the war in Ukraine. Traditionally the US military has relied heavily on air assets to deliver heavy fires at very long ranges, with army artillery and missile units doing their best work in comparatively closer. But on a massively networked battlefield, and with allies and competitors rushing to field longer-ranged army missile systems, the US army is now pushing ahead with a massive modernisation program to extend its reach. This episode asks how the US army fell behind in range, whether that matters, and what they plan to do about it.
Long before equipment reaches the front, it must first be ordered, designed, produced and fielded. This is a process that nations have been going through for centuries. That doesn't mean they're always good at it. With every year that passes it seems that military equipment becomes more expensive, delivery schedules blow out more, and failures mount. Sometimes the answer may be corruption - but sometimes it's just a case of mistakes being made and things going wrong. In this video I want to have a look at some reasons why...
Most observers (Western and Russian) seem to have expected Ukraine to go over onto the offensive sometime in the 2023 campaign season. Such a move was well telegraphed and a natural extension of Ukraine's stated objectives of taking back occupied territories from the Russian Federation. By mid-June, it was clear Ukraine had started an offensive effort, launching probing actions at multiple points along the front and finally showing some of the heavy Western equipment it had received over the last six months. Those initial attacks ran into the teeth of heavy Russian defences, and progress since then has been slower than the Ukrainian High Command may have hoped. Initially I had planned not to touch these developments for some time - but with the recent information environment extending the full range of takes from 'Ukraine has lost the war' to 'everything is according to plan' I thought it was worth making an effort to try and clearly interpret (as far as possible) the data as we
The Wagner mutiny of late June is likely one of the more dramatic events of the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2023, and one that caught many observers and the international audience off guard. Despite being closely watched by people around the world - much about the mutiny remains unknown - from its true purpose to the details of how and why it seemed to suddenly end. In this episode I look at what we know so far, ask what prospects the attempt had for success, what observations we can tentatively make, and what the impacts going forward might be.
We spend a lot of time on this channel focusing on how nations prepare for and fight wars - and comparatively little on the thinking that goes into bringing about their end - negotiated or otherwise. In this episode I take a bit of a break to talk about the theory behind deciding when and how nations might chose to end a war, the various ways in which they might chose to do it - and all the reasons that pure rationality is a pretty imperfect framework for predicting the behaviour of nations. Apologies for the late release, and I hope you all enjoy.
While systems like tanks, jets and cruise missiles tend to capture the public imagination, the war in Ukraine in 2023 is largely being fought with much the same tools as it was in 2022 - artillery. The constant exchange of fire has been critical to the battle, enabling attrition, blunting attacks and enabling advances. Both sides have continued to adapt, trying to refine their tactics and capabilities while wearing down their opponent. But in this attritional struggle, losses and resupply of systems, barrels and ammunition matter, not just tactics. Ukraine now finds itself in an ammunition deficit - trying to attack at a time where its allies have not yet ramped up production enough to readily meet its needs. It's in that context that the US recently announced the supply of cluster munitions to refill Ukraine's ammunition bunkers. Today we look at those munitions, their likely impact, as well as the broader course of the artillery war in Ukraine one year on from my original video o
Across other videos I've often hinted at the Republic of Korea as something of a military outlier. A major power that, at a time that other forces are battling a shortage of artillery, manpower or heavy equipment - still had all of the above at its disposal in serious quantities. Because whereas many other nations in places like Europe embraced the peace dividend of the 1990s, the ROK's strategic context remained complex and threatening - with North Korea's massive conventional (and now nuclear) arsenal constantly ready to resume a war that never officially ended. The ROK's defence strategy is a story of a nation having to make sacrifices and prioritise in order to contain and deter serious threats within the limits of the nation's limited resources. It's an interesting study in a major military for whom mass and artillery firepower remain key tools of deterrence and security - and it is likewise a story of a nation that has gone from a minor actor in the international arms market, t
While the hardest fighting in Ukraine takes place on land, the Black Sea front saw a stand-off through most of 2022 and early 2023. Russia's fleet was ranged away from the coast by AShMs, but continued to fire cruise missiles from afar. As time has gone on, the fighting has evolved and new weapons have been deployed, including long range drones. At the same time, the deal which allowed millions of tonnes of foodstuffs to safely transit the Black Sea now seems to have ended, setting the stage for a potential escalation in fighting and a potential blockade. In this episode, I look at the naval war in 2023, the strikes on the bridge, and the potentially vast implications of the end of the grain export deal.
Ankara's role during the war in Ukraine is a complex and sometimes controversial one. As a NATO member but not an EU state, the Turks have continued to expand their trade with Russia and have continued an open dialogue with Moscow. On the other hand, Türkiye's military industry has supplied Ukraine even before the full scale invasion and Turkish policy has been full throated in its support for Ukraine's territorial integrity - including Crimea. Turkish policy is complex and, to use the words of a former NATO assistant Secretary General - compartmentalised. It often involves cooperation even with potential strategic rivals, and sometimes tense and transactional interactions with general allies. In this episode I wanted to explore the nation's defence capabilities, economic and strategic situation, and see how that may have helped inform Erdogan's policy in Ukraine - and how that policy may impact the war going forward.
Usually on my channel we focus on questions of defence economics - elements like national resources, production, stockpiles and logistics that feed into the ability of a nation to carry on a war. But I also try to always flag the importance of political and social elements as well - the ways in which politics and the will to fight can complicate what would otherwise be a largely mathematical exercise. While those factors are important however, Russian politics is not my area of academic or professional focus. Today I'm releasing an interview recorded with Danish military analyst Anders Puck Nielsen at the Royal Danish Defence College. Anders has long had a focus on Russia and the Russian military, and so I was keen to get his thoughts on Russia's political and social divisions of power, attitudes towards the war, and how these might factor into Ukraine's theory of potential victory. All thoughts expressed are obviously his own personal ones (though all slide content was produced
2022 dramatically changed rhetoric around NATO's strategic position and the importance of conventional military deterrence and preparedness, particularly in Europe. While many politicians were quick to speak on the need to respond decisively to the new envioronment, both by aiding Ukraine and also building up domestic capability, there was an open question over whether the will and capacity was there to convert announcements into orders and deliveries. Today, we look at NATO defence spending estimates for 2023 to get an idea of what patterns are emerging, and ask how NATO is responding to the Russian challenge.
Over the course of the war in Ukraine, Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin and Wagner Group became household names around the world. From their fighting at Bakhmut, to their standoffs with the Russian MoD leadership, to the dramatic march on Moscow followed by a public truce, the PMC and its leader often dominated the news. But on 23 August, Prigozhin's story seems (so far) to have come to a very public end, when a jet carrying him and other Wagner members crashed in Russia with no reported survivors. What does that mean for the PMC, Russia, Africa & the West? Those are questions I'll ask today.
While the Ukrainian army has demonstrated that it's capable of fighting Russian forces on the ground, the air-war in Ukraine has always been far more asymmetric. In this episode we look at the changing nature of that war, including the emergence of behind-the-lines strikes, and the upcoming arrival of the much awaited F-16s for Ukraine's air force.
Why keep a base open if the military doesn't need it? Why pick a potentially second best product? Welcome to the world of incentives & interests in defence procurement. Budget and procurement decisions can shape militaries. They determine where troops are based, what equipment they use and a thousand other factors from their pay and compensation to how deep the reserve munitions stocks run in the event of war. Given that, you'd be forgiven for thinking that the process would be simple - with the absolute focus being on getting exactly the equipment and facilities needed at the best possible price. So why does it seem to go wrong so often? Sometimes the answer might be corruption or errors (we've talked about those before and will again in future), but sometimes the answer might be a little more complicated. Procurement decisions based not just on getting the best price and product, but also on a need to preserve industry competition, support local interests or maintain critical
The war in Ukraine is one of relentless attrition. While territory usually only changes hands extremely slowly, munitions and equipment and destroyed and consumed at prodigious rates in a fires-dominated slugging match. In that kind of struggle, the endurance of a military may owe a lot to the pipeline of replacement equipment that supports it. For Ukraine, that largely means looking into the details of foreign equipment provision and some Ukrainian domestic production. But for Russia, without as many allies to call on, one of the key factors is probably defence industrial output, a topic which is widely contested in news and propaganda. According to some sources, Russia produces enough equipment to overpower all of NATO alone, acording to those on the other extreme, it produces little of value or quality. In this episode, I try to dive into Russian data as well as battlefield loss observations to try and get an understanding of where the truth lies. Trying to understand how much e
We've previously talked about 6th Generation fighters on this channel ( • The Race for 6th Generation Fighters ... ) but when they take to the skies, they won't be doing so alone. Increasingly autonomous and capable unmanned combat aircraft are here, and they are going to change the way you build an air force. Forces around the world are talking about the immense possibilities of combining manned and unmanned systems together into a cohesive team. In this episode I discuss the concepts behind drone wingmen, some of the major development programs, and what they might mean for the future of air warfare.
The logistical challenges in Ukraine are not limited to supplying forces in the field, they also extend to the absolutely vital task of recovering and treating the wounded. In this episode we explore recent publications on battlefield threats, medical treatment, and innovations in Ukraine - and reflect on what lessons other nations observing the hard fighting there might be able to learn to better prepare themselves for potential future conflicts Adsense proceeds from this video will be donated to support medical care and training in Ukraine.
After more than four months of fighting, Ukraine's counteroffensive is grinding on. There have been none of the rapid mechanised advances many Ukrainian allies hoped for. Instead, there has been a hard, grinding assault intended to slowly break into, and eventually through, the main belt of Russian fixed defences. Today I want to look at the way the counteroffensive has evolved over time, what we've learned about Russian defences and tactics, and what all of that might mean as months of mud and winter cold grow ever closer.
Israeli Defence Force is arguably one of the more unique militaries around the world, combining a rapid mass mobilisation system with a strategy that prioritises a unique mix of offensive, defensive and industrial capabilities. Now, with Israel mobilising those reserves and declaring a state of war, the capabilities of the IDF have taken on particularly pressing geopolitical significance, and so I thought it was time to take a closer look at the force, as we have previously for nations like Japan and the Republic of Korea. In this video I look at the history of some major IDF operations, the development of Israeli strategy, doctrine, and capabilities and some initial observations arising out of the events of the last week. I do want to say however, that as noted in the video, most of this presentation was prepared before the events of the last week in Israel and Gaza. As a result, they focus on the IDF from a strategic and defence-industrial perspective with observations arising
Many weapon systems sent to Ukraine or deployed by Russia have been characterised by at least some commentators as potential "game changers." From Javelin to Lancet and the Leopard 2, many new systems have been introduced and/or scaled up in use over the course of the war, and some have entered in dramatic fashion (as with the recent ATACMS strikes). In this episode I review a sample of "game changer" systems, discuss how we might evaluate whether or not a system deserves the title, and figure out what each did, or didn't, do to change the war in Ukraine.
Since the second world war, the aircraft carrier has been a dominant symbol of naval might. Now however, the Aircraft carrier is facing a growing family of new and evolving threats, ranging from anti ship ballistic missiles and hypersonics, to more capable submarines and unmanned systems. Some argue that these threats mean the Carrier may be ready to go the way of the battleship, becoming obsolete. On the other hand, those same nations perfecting anti-carrier weapons are also investing extensively in new carriers of their own, suggesting they retain value. In this video I look at carrier evolution, fleets, roles, threats - and the potential future of these extremely expensive platforms.
Compared to many of the other militaries we’ve looked at, Iran’s force structure and overarching strategy stands out. From its arsenal of Shah era weapons to its new generation of missiles, in this episode we did a bit deeper into Iran’s military capabilities, limitations, and the industrial capabilities behind them.
A few weeks ago, I looked at some of the many systems that have been used in Ukraine that attracted their share of of media hype and asked whether they delivered on their hype. Today, I round out that list with more hyped up systems that didn't make in into the first video, while also looking at some that I'd probably nominate as just as, or more significant, that the ones drawing heaps of media attention. Expect a focus on the importance of context and opportunity costs as we look at Kizhal, SCALP, the TB-2 drone and Orlan drones, as well as Starlink and Russia's extensive park of EW assets. Thank you all of you who voted for this topic - I hope you enjoy.
Why are nations building nukes again? And do the ones they have actually work? The final years of the Cold War and the post-Soviet era that followed were a period of successive victories for efforts at nuclear stockpile reduction and disarmament. But in 2023, efforts at new arms control agreements appear dead in the water, and many nations are now either looking to replace old systems or, like China, expanding their arsenals beyond their present levels. In this episode, I look at nuclear modernisation, new delivery systems, and the industrial and financial challenges involved.
As we head into December, Ukraine is getting colder and the campaign friendly weather of mid-year is long gone. Despite that Russia has launched perhaps its largest offensive of 2023, targeting the salient around the Ukrainian city of Avdiivka - burning through armour and manpower in the face of a stubborn Ukrainian defence. At the same time, with it now clear Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia offensive will not reach its objectives this year, Ukraine has escalated its efforts on a different front, establishing several small bridgeheads across the Dnipro in Kherson Oblast. In this episode, I look at some of the key Ukrainian and Russian offensive efforts of late 2023, examine the data we have on losses and attrition, and ask what the fighting might tell us about the state of the forces involved, and the way this war is being fought.
It's increasingly understood that the war in Ukraine is likely to be a long and hard one - and in that kind of attrition based struggle, resources and political will can matter as much as battlefield victories or defeats. Today I cover the topic of war exhaustion, asking not whether each side has the physical resources to continue, but instead what the data says about the willingness of voters and leaders in Ukraine, Russia, and Ukraine's allies to stay the course and push on despite the costs of war - and what it may mean for the war in 2024.
Until recently, the comparatively small nation of Guyana didn't make global news particularly often. What was reported was generally a good news story - With oil discoveries and growing production driving rapid economic growth in the historically poor nation. Now the nation is in the global spotlight as with the escalation of a centuries old territorial dispute, and neighbouring Venezuela asserting an intention to incorporate more than two thirds of Guyana's current territory into Venezuela. Is the move simply domestically focused theatre, an attempt to pressure Guyana and the USA, or the prelude to a South American take on the 'Special Military Operation?' In this episode we discuss the nations involved, their motivations, resources, and try to ask why this is happening, and what may come next. One note: I want to feature up here I refer to Russia as an OPEC member as shorthand in this video. They are more accurately described as a member of OPEC+ .
How do you train an army to fight a war that is different from any you've ever experienced? Support for Ukraine has played a vital role in shaping the progress of the war in Ukraine to date. Ukrainian efforts have heavily leveraged munitions and systems supplied by their allies - but training has also been a key area for allied support Unlike weapon systems however, evaluating the performance of NATO's training efforts are harder to determine. Reporting tends to focus on the quantity of troops going through these programs, but less reporting focuses on whether the training properly matches the realities of the Ukrainian battlefield To get a better understanding of NATO's efforts to train with Ukraine in the years leading up to 2022 and since the full scale invasion, as well as some of the lessons members of the alliance might be learning from the war, today I'm welcoming back retired US Army Lieutenant General Ben Hodges. LTG Hodges (Ret.) is a former commander of US Army Europe and
When debates arise on what the worlds strongest militaries are, attention tends to focus on the United States, PRC, and the Russian Federation. Less often mentioned is India...and I think that's a massive oversight. With a rapidly growing economy, young demography, and a developing military industry, India's military evolution and strategy are likely to become ever more significant regional and global factors in the coming years. So today, let's talk about it
The global economic system is built on trade, and to trade, you need ships and safe, efficient routes. Often, that mean travelling through maritime choke points, where geography squeezes trade through a concentrated point. In the Red Sea, one of those chokepoints has come under pressure as a result of attacks by the Houthi movement based in Yemen, driving hundreds of vessels to divert to much longer routes around Africa. Now, US and Houthi forces have exchanged fire, with several Houthi boats reportedly being destroyed attempting to board a container ship. And beyond the risk of this particular campaign, the sight of relatively cheap attacks reshaping the contours of global trade may serve as a warning to decision makers elsewhere. After all, if technology and techniques can be applied in the Red Sea, why not at other maritime chokepoints around the world? On that cheery note, welcome to 2024.
For nearly two years now, I've been using this channel to explore questions relating to wars, defence strategy and economics. I've been able to do so because of the unwavering support from all of you. So today, as a way to welcome 2024, I'm answer your questions for a change: What are the modern roles for tactical nuclear weapons? How have Special Operations Forces been used in Ukraine? Would I rather fight a cruiser sized duck or a thousand duck sized cruisers? What can I tell you about the Perun audience? And how did this "Perun" bloke end up talking about Defence Economics anyway? Hope you enjoy this special episode, and we'll be back to regular content next week.
Whatever its equipment, a military is nothing without its people. As many militaries struggle with recruitment, the armies in Ukraine grow older, and countries in Asia grapple with the implications of ageing populations, it's becoming clear that getting the right people may be as much of a challenge for forces as getting the right technology. So today, we look at that age old problem. How do militaries get people, why are so many struggling - and what might they be able to do about it?
Earlier this month, Bloomberg carried an article which included claims about corruption in the PRC's Rocket Force . Those claims have gotten plenty of attention – so today, I want to look into corruption and anti-corruption campaigns in the PRC, some of the claims from the article, how we might interpret them, and what all this might mean for the PLA and the region