Trent Hone and Justin Pyke discuss the role of the different radars and their effect the War in the Pacific in this short outtake of the upcoming long podcast on US Navy Night Fighting in World War 2. Link to the video on the CIC: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KyuN7WFUgX4 Disclaimer: I received a complimentary copy of Learning War from Naval Institute Press for content production. Check out Trent’s Blog here: https://trenthone.com Trent's Twitter: https://twitter.com/Honer_CUT Justin's Twitter: https://twitter.com/CBI_PTO_History Cover design by vonKickass. 0:00 - Intro 1:42 - Brief discussion of the conventional view of U.S. Navy night-fighting capability. 3:57 - How far back was the U.S. Navy seriously grappling with night-fighting? 6:39 - How much did the U.S. Navy’s thinking about night-fighting change in the interwar years? How did they conceptualize what night battles would look like? Did their thinking pass through any distinct phases during the interwar years, or was there a great deal of continuity? 14:16 - What kind of blind spots were present in the U.S. Navy’s assumptions about night-combat in the interwar period? 18:30 - Your chapter on the night battles around Guadalcanal is entitled “Heuristics at Guadalcanal.” What do you mean by that? 23:45 - The night battles off Guadalcanal kicked off with a humiliating defeat, the Battle of Savo Island. Was this defeat a result of poor USN preparation for night battles or other factors? 31:13 - What was the role of radar in the night battles off Guadalcanal? How was the USN attempting to integrate its use into their tactics, and how successful were they in iron bottom sound? 39:21 - Was the USN effective at analyzing the results of battles and internalizing lessons learned? Why the final defeat at the Battle of Tassafaronga? 46:41 - To sum up this phase of the war, what weaknesses of the U.S. Navy did the actions off Guadalcanal expose and how did the USN ultimately win? 53:08 - The J