Now, one common joke about the Wehrmacht is that their logistics were bad, especially when it comes to Operation Barbarossa. And this is usually explained with the lack of trucks, hubris and other aspects. Yet, I think, that this view is might be a bit too simple and does not encompass the whole situation. So, I think we need to take a look at the bigger picture and by this, I mean let’s look at the globe and also expand the timeline. Cover colorization by vonKickass. »» GET OUR BOOK «« » Army Regulation Medium Panzer Company 1941 - http://www.hdv470-7.com/ »» SUPPORT MHV «« » paypal donation - https://paypal.me/mhvis » patreon - https://www.patreon.com/mhv » subscribe star - https://www.subscribestar.com/mhv » Book Wishlist https://www.amazon.de/gp/registry/wishlist/3LJIXNJIUXJES/ref=cm_wl_huc_view?language=en_GB »» MERCHANDISE «« » teespring - https://teespring.com/stores/military-history-visualized » SOURCES « Groß, Gerhard P.: Mythos und Wirklichkeit. Die Geschichte des operativen Denkens im deutschen Heer von Moltke d. Ä. bis Heusinger (Zeitalter der Weltkriege, Band 9). Ferdinand Schönigh: Paderborn, 2012. (ENGLISH VERSION BELOW) Groß, Gerhard P.; Zabecki, David T. (Ed.): The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger (Foreign Military Studies), University Press of Kentucky, 2018. Creveld, Martin van: Supplying War. Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. Second Edition. Cambridge University Press, 2004 Cambridge History of the First World War. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2016 (2014). Davie, H. G. W. Logistics of the Combined-Arms Army — Motor Transport, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 31:4, 2018, p. 474-501, DOI: 10.1080/13518046.2018.1521360 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13518046.2018.1521360 Davie, H. G. W. The Influence of Railways on Military Operations in the Russo-German War 1941–1945, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 30:2